The arrest in Bolivia of Argentine political consultant Fernando Cerimedo—suspected of ordering the attack on his ex-partner Nadia Beller—might have been reduced to nothing more than a sensational criminal case. But the raids, judicial investigations, and revelations that have unfolded since mid-August 2026 reveal a much broader reality. From Bolsonaro’s Brazil to Milei’s Argentina, passing through Honduras, Rodrigo Paz’s Bolivia, and now José Antonio Kast’s Chile, Cerimedo’s trajectory offers a glimpse into a transnational ecosystem in which political consultants, partisan media outlets, influencers, capital, and technologies for manipulating social media circulate.

On August 17, 2026, in front of a hotel in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, two men who arrived on a motorcycle and were dressed as delivery drivers opened fire on Nadia Beller. The Bolivian lawyer was shot three times but survived. Since then, the police have identified the two alleged perpetrators of the attack. One of them is a Colombian citizen, Aldubar Herny Silva Peña, alias “Juancho,” initially identified by investigators as the man who shot Beller; the other is Edson Vega Justiniano, alias “Don Fiti.” Both are currently wanted. However, on September 1, “Juancho” reappeared in a video released from hiding: he admits to having participated in planning the operation, though he denies having fired the shots himself, and claims that Beller was only supposed to receive “a warning,” while the real target was allegedly a prominent Argentine figure. Beller categorically rejects this version of events.

On the day of the attack, a few hours after the shooting, her ex-partner, Fernando Cerimedo, was arrested at Viru Viru International Airport in Bolivia as he was about to board an Aerolíneas Argentinas flight bound for Buenos Aires. Cerimedo denies having ordered the attack, but Bolivian authorities ordered his pretrial detention for six months as part of the investigation into attempted femicide. As noted by Reuters, which has been reporting on his arrest since August 18, he is far from an unknown figure: an advisor to current Bolivian President Rodrigo Paz, he was one of the strategists for Javier Milei’s campaign in Argentina and had previously maintained ties with Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil.

The case could have ended there: a particularly violent settling of scores in the context of a romantic breakup. But since Cerimedo’s arrest, every new raid, every forensic analysis of his phones, and every testimony has revealed ramifications that extend far beyond Bolivia’s borders. Subsequent developments quickly gave the case an entirely different dimension: investigators turned their attention to Cerimedo’s finances and digital activities, while his ties to various leaders of the Latin American right and far right came to light once again.

In Argentina, Cerimedo’s visits to the Casa Rosada are causing unease within Javier Milei’s administration; in Chile, his ties to José Antonio Kast’s inner circle and his potential role in digital campaigns have already led to legal action and investigations by state oversight agencies, as well as an attempt to establish a parliamentary commission of inquiry. What began with three gunshots outside a hotel in Santa Cruz is gradually becoming a regional political issue.

It is precisely this shift in scale that makes the Cerimedo case particularly interesting. Since the attack, Nadia Beller has made a series of revelations about her ex-partner’s activities, particularly regarding fuel and gold operations, possible clandestine financial networks, digital infrastructure designed for large-scale intervention on social media, and Cerimedo’s ties to various political figures. Several of these elements have since led to investigations by Bolivian judicial authorities. But above all, the case highlights a much broader and already well-documented reality: for several years now, Cerimedo has been at the intersection of election campaigns, far-right media outlets, political communications firms, and digital networks operating across several countries on the continent. However, the case is far from closed. Since Fernando Cerimedo’s arrest, new developments have emerged almost daily: raids, phone forensic analyses, testimonies, legal proceedings, and revelations in the press in Bolivia and other countries. Some information published today may, therefore, be supplemented, clarified, or rendered obsolete by the next day. This investigation reflects the status of the case as of September 2, 2026, and will be updated as new information emerges.

From Bolsonaro to Milei, and then to Rodrigo Paz

Cerimedo first came to prominence in Argentina as a far-right activist and digital strategist. Beginning in 2021, he took on a key role at *La Derecha Diario*, a media outlet founded in Argentina in 2019 that has since become an influential far-right platform in several Latin American countries. Its audience relies heavily on social media: in June 2026, the outlet had approximately 1.3 million followers across its various platforms, of which more than half a million were on X. As a sign of its close ties to the Argentine government and its reach, Javier Milei shared posts from La Derecha Diario 1,539 times over a five-month period in 2025, according to El País.

His political influence grew with the rise of Javier Milei. He became one of the digital communications specialists for this libertarian far-right movement and played a key role in the successful 2023 presidential campaign.

Following his arrest, Milei stated, however, that Cerimedo had had no ties to his movement since that year. Official records reviewed by La Nación tell a significantly different story: Cerimedo entered the Casa Rosada at least thirteen times between December 11, 2023—the day after Milei’s inauguration—and June 5, 2024. Obviously, these records do not reveal the nature of their meetings, but they do show that his ties to Argentina’s new administration did not end with the conclusion of the election campaign.

Cerimedo’s arrest also reignited the debate in Argentina over the financing of *La Derecha Diario*. On August 26, Congresswoman Myriam Bregman—a member of the FIT-U (Left and Workers’ Front-Unity)—questioned the government in the Chamber of Deputies to ask how much money YPF—an oil company controlled by the Argentine government—had paid to La Derecha Diario for advertising. She also questioned whether funding had come from Aerolíneas Argentinas and the provincial governments of Córdoba and Tucumán. “These attacks that begin on social media end up in real life,” she stated, drawing a link between the violent campaigns waged by *La Derecha Diario* against its political opponents and the Cerimedo case. The Argentine press has already documented payments from the Córdoba government, but the amount paid by YPF has not been made public. Bregman’s remarks thus raise a broader question: To what extent has the growth of this far-right media outlet—which openly declares its hostility toward the state and the public sector—been financed with money from public companies or institutions?

Before Milei, Cerimedo had already gained international experience in Brazil. Following Jair Bolsonaro’s defeat by Lula in October 2022, he actively participated in questioning the reliability of the Brazilian electoral system and spread the allegations of fraud made by Bolsonaro’s supporters. He later became involved in Honduras alongside Nasry Asfura, a right-wing candidate backed by Donald Trump.¹ In each of these countries, we see the same areas of expertise: digital political communication, amplifying content on social media, and building media outlets or platforms capable of directly disseminating a political message while bypassing traditional media.

Bolivia marks a new chapter. Cerimedo participated in Rodrigo Paz’s 2025 campaign and subsequently remained part of his inner circle after Paz became president. Paz asserts that Cerimedo never held an official position, never had a contract with the government, and was never authorized to represent the government. However, several details that have emerged since his arrest paint a picture of a much more significant role. The Prosecutor’s Office raided an office in La Paz rented by Cerimedo for 25,000 bolivianos a month—approximately 3,100 euros—which, according to the prosecutor in charge of the operation, was intended to handle the logistics of his work as a government advisor. Officials interviewed by El Deber also state that he was involved in the communication strategies of several ministries. Vice President Edmand Lara goes much further: he asserts that Cerimedo participated in Cabinet meetings, gave instructions to certain ministers, and even intervened in appointments. “Cerimedo had power and made decisions within the government,” he states. Behind the controversy over his official status lies a much more uncomfortable question for Rodrigo Paz: What real power did a foreign political consultant—who held no public office—exercise at the heart of the Bolivian government?

Cerimedo’s career thus provides a concrete example of how this transnational far-right ecosystem operates: circulating from one country to another are not only consultants, but also communication methods, activist media outlets, networks of social media accounts, amplification technologies, and political contacts. And their role does not necessarily end with an electoral victory: the Bolivian case shows how a foreign campaign strategist can continue to exert influence at the heart of power and even—according to Vice President Lara’s accusations—directly intervene in its operations.

The arrest opens the black box

The attack on Nadia Beller brutally changed the situation, as Cerimedo’s arrest allowed investigators to gain access to what had until then remained largely hidden: his properties, his phones and computers, but also part of his financial networks. The first raids carried out in La Paz quickly took an unexpected turn. During four raids carried out in La Paz as part of the investigation into Cerimedo, the prosecutor’s office seized more than 500,000 bolivianos in cash—approximately 62,000 euros—as well as unspecified amounts in dollars and euros, documents, and various pieces of technological equipment. At one of the properties, the La Paz departmental prosecutor announced the discovery of what he described as a “bot farm”—an infrastructure that allows for the simultaneous management of numerous social media accounts (see the box “Trolls, bots, fake accounts: How is the impression of a majority created?”). The material was seized for analysis. Cerimedo’s defense team disputes this characterization and asserts that the devices presented as part of a bot farm were, among other things, satellite phones and Internet modems.

But the contents of Cerimedo’s phone are potentially even more compromising than the material that was seized. According to the expert report included in the court file and revealed by the Argentine press, investigators found a conversation containing the following phrase: “Either we take her out now or we’re screwed,” followed by exchanges about finding someone capable of doing “the job.” On the very night of the attack, a contact listed under the initials “ECG” informed Cerimedo almost in real time that Nadia Beller had just been shot several times and sent him information and photographs apparently taken at the scene of the attack. Both Beller and former President Evo Morales have publicly identified “ECG” as Erick Correa Gonzales, described as the head of intelligence for the Special Force to Combat Drug Trafficking (FELCN). However, this identification has not been confirmed by the Prosecutor’s Office. Even more surprising, given the content of the exchanges, is that to date no public information indicates an arrest warrant or charges against Correa Gonzales in the investigation into the attack. If “ECG” is indeed the FELCN official identified by Beller and Morales, the apparent lack of legal action against him inevitably raises the question of possible protection within the Bolivian state apparatus.

At the same time, the investigation expanded to include the consultant’s financial networks. The Prosecutor’s Office raided several currency exchange offices in La Paz. At one of them, located in the Calacoto neighborhood, Prosecutor Miguel Cardozo states that Cerimedo would go there to receive and deliver money that was later distributed elsewhere, and that initial investigations reveal approximately $400,000 in transactions in his favor. An analysis of his phone also uncovered another lead. According to a technical report from the Prosecutor’s Office revealed by La Nación, investigators identified cryptocurrency transfers linked to a major “virtual cave”—a type of clandestine currency exchange operating online. They are now attempting to reconstruct these financial networks, identify the individuals and entities through which the money passed, and determine the origin and destination of the funds.

These findings led to the opening of a new case involving illicit enrichment and the laundering of illicit proceeds. On August 29, following a hearing that lasted nearly six hours, Judge Douglas Borda ordered a second six-month pretrial detention for Cerimedo, this time at the maximum-security prison in Chonchocoro, near La Paz. However, his defense team appealed the decision, and as of early September, his transfer from the Palmasola prison in Santa Cruz had not yet taken place.

The investigation now encompasses a much broader scope than the initial case: assets, large sums of cash—the Prosecutor’s Office reported, among other things, the discovery of $50,000 during a raid—currency exchange offices, cryptocurrency transfers, and financial networks whose origin, beneficiaries, and destination the Bolivian justice system is attempting to determine. On August 31, Senator Leonardo Roca joined the proceedings as a party and announced that he would provide the Prosecutor’s Office with the results of a digital investigation that would reveal a network of cryptocurrency wallets linked to Cerimedo and significant fund transfers.

At the same time, another investigation was opened in the department of Beni, this time into trafficking in controlled substances and criminal conspiracy. On August 28, Attorney General Róger Mariaca confirmed that the investigation had been opened based on various reports and the testimony of Nadia Beller. The investigation concerns possible protection granted to irregular flights operating out of Santa Ana del Yacuma, a region through which small aircraft suspected of being linked to drug trafficking travel. According to the Beni Prosecutor’s Office, some of these flights were reportedly bound for Brazil. The investigation is now seeking to identify the individuals who allegedly provided this cover and to determine whether officials or leaders of institutions responsible for combating drug trafficking were involved. On September 1, Departmental Prosecutor Alexander Mendoza announced that Nadia Beller would soon be summoned to Trinidad to give a statement considered “crucial and essential” to the continuation of the investigation. Officials from various institutions will also be required to testify in order to verify whether state agents did in fact protect those flights and whether they received financial benefits in exchange.

Nadia Beller’s allegations go much further. She mentions fuel import operations in Bolivia, an attempt to export 189 kilograms of gold—with an estimated value of about $25 million—to Dubai, which was intercepted at Viru Viru Airport before departure, as well as various financial schemes of which Cerimedo allegedly had knowledge or in which he allegedly participated. On September 1, Beller also released an audio recording in which Cerimedo himself is heard discussing the case of the 189 kilograms of gold and the steps taken to prevent the arrest of the young man who was transporting the shipment. The recording was turned over to the District Attorney’s Office for forensic analysis.

He also claims that his ex-partner’s digital infrastructure was far more significant than the evidence discovered during the initial raids. In an interview published on August 31 by the Brazilian media outlet Diário do Centro do Mundo, Beller describes a major facility in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, in the Equipetrol neighborhood, which he claims to have seen during video conferences, as well as another in Buenos Aires. He speaks of numerous phones and SIM cards used to manage social media accounts on a massive scale, thus describing a digital infrastructure capable of intervening on a large scale in the political debate.

The case takes on an even more disturbing dimension with the emergence of a new figure: María Argentina Rojas Roca. In May 2026, she had been appointed customs administrator at Viru Viru International Airport in Santa Cruz, a particularly sensitive position, as it controls one of the country’s main points of entry and exit. Her appointment quickly sparked a scandal when her past in Brazil came to light: Rojas Roca had been convicted and imprisoned there for drug trafficking before being deported from the country. Even more troubling, a financial disclosure statement indicated that she had already been working at the agency since January 8, 2026. Customs explained that, at the time of her appointment, she had submitted a Bolivian criminal record certificate that did not list any convictions in the country; the required documents do not appear to have revealed her conviction in Brazil. Once this information became public, her appointment at Viru Viru was immediately revoked.

But this revocation leaves one question unanswered: Who had recommended Rojas Roca for such a sensitive position? The appointment memorandum was signed by the president of the National Customs Service, Alberto Samuel Soto de la Vía, but so far no public information has made it possible to identify the person or persons who had endorsed his candidacy. Nadia Beller claims to have personally questioned Cerimedo about this appointment and asked him how someone with such a track record could end up heading customs operations at an international airport. According to her account, Cerimedo reportedly replied that Rojas Roca had a “political endorsement.”

The case has taken on a completely different dimension today. Rojas Roca is now directly implicated in the investigation into the attack on Nadia Beller. Beller asserts that the evidence added to the case file reveals contacts, money transfers, and meetings between the former head of Customs and individuals suspected of having participated in the attack in the days leading up to it. And, above all, this is no longer just about Beller’s accusations: the Santa Cruz District Attorney’s Office issued an arrest warrant for Rojas Roca as part of the investigation into the attempted murder. This points to a particularly disturbing connection between the inner circle of Cerimedo—a woman who was briefly placed in charge of customs at a strategic airport despite a conviction in Brazil related to drug trafficking—and the men suspected of having participated in the attack on Nadia Beller.

The accumulation of these revelations is now beginning to turn the legal case into a political crisis. On September 1, former President Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga—Rodrigo Paz’s opponent in the second round of the 2025 presidential election—called on the head of state to request the creation of an independent international commission tasked with investigating the entire Cerimedo-Beller case. For Quiroga, only an external investigation would dispel the suspicions now surrounding the political ramifications of the case. Following the revelations about Cerimedo’s role within the presidential inner circle, the case is thus beginning to become a matter of state for Rodrigo Paz’s administration.

In Chile, the case takes on a political dimension

It is precisely in Chile where Cerimedo’s arrest is beginning to have the most significant political consequences. On August 31, President José Antonio Kast was forced to publicly address questions about his relationship with the Argentine consultant. He categorically denied that Cerimedo had worked for any of his campaigns or that his government had used his services, but he acknowledged knowing him personally and having met with him on several occasions at international political gatherings. “I know him because he has accompanied various political leaders on different occasions when we’ve crossed paths,” Kast explained in an interview published by BioBioChile.

This revelation comes at the same time that an extensive investigation published that same day by BioBioChile’s investigative unit lends new weight to questions about Cerimedo’s activities in Chile. His company, Numen, had already been involved in the 2020 constitutional process, notably with a high-profile poll that ultimately proved to be far off the mark compared to the plebiscite’s actual results. But attention is now focused primarily on the 2025 presidential campaign and the possible existence of coordinated efforts aimed at pushing certain topics into the digital conversation and attacking José Antonio Kast’s opponents.

The investigation shines a spotlight in particular on Martín Arrau, who is now the Minister of Security and a member of the president’s inner circle. Several people who participated in Kast’s campaign told BioBioChile that Arrau, who at the time headed the campaign’s digital operations, had boasted to a leader of Chile Vamos—the traditional Chilean right-wing coalition—about his team’s ability to make an issue one of the most discussed topics on social media and keep it there for one or two days. Arrau acknowledges having had that capacity for influence but asserts that it was based exclusively on the effective organization of activists and “real people.” He denies any use of bots, as well as any connection to Cerimedo.

Questions also center on several anonymous accounts that were particularly active during the campaign. An analysis conducted by the Chile Vamos team and cited in a complaint filed with the Chilean Attorney General’s Office estimated that approximately 38% of the accounts involved in attacks against Evelyn Matthei, the traditional right-wing candidate in the 2025 presidential election, also supported the Republican Party, José Antonio Kast’s far-right party. Several accounts—including @Drestrump_PL, @kasterizador, and @JackedIn—had been identified as particularly active. It was precisely in this digital environment that the false rumor circulated that Matthei was suffering from Alzheimer’s disease. The @JackedIn account had also posted 84 hostile messages against Johannes Kaiser, another candidate from Chile’s radical right and a rival of Kast’s, between April and June 2025.

Two other highly active accounts, Neuroc and DresTrumpi, disappeared from X shortly after Cerimedo’s arrest in Bolivia and the prosecutor’s office’s discovery, at a property linked to him, of what it described as a “bot farm”—an infrastructure that allows for the simultaneous management of numerous social media accounts. Their nearly simultaneous disappearance immediately fueled questions in Chile about their possible ties to the digital networks associated with Cerimedo.

The case has now crossed a political, judicial, and institutional threshold. Socialist Congressman Juan Santana filed a complaint with the Public Prosecutor’s Office to determine whether Cerimedo participated in a coordinated social media account network in Chile and whether any crimes were committed. On September 1, National Prosecutor Ángel Valencia announced that the complaint would be referred to the Central-North Metropolitan Prosecutor’s Office, which must determine whether there are any cybercrimes, threats, or acts that could constitute a criminal conspiracy. Santana and Communist Congressman Luis Cuello simultaneously approached the Comptroller General’s Office to request an investigation into possible links between Cerimedo, public officials, and the digital networks in question.

That same day, the opposition attempted to establish a special parliamentary commission of inquiry into the case. The proposal received 60 votes in favor, 41 against, and two abstentions. Although it garnered a clear majority among the deputies present, it fell short of the 62-vote quorum required to establish the commission: it was, therefore, two votes short. The result was due in particular to the absence of several members of Congress during the vote. However, the following day, September 2, a new motion was put to a vote and finally approved by a vote of 69 to 43, with one abstention. The special investigative commission was thus established to examine the possible use of bots, automated accounts, coordinated networks, disinformation techniques, and artificial intelligence tools in the electoral and referendum processes held in Chile since 2020.

In just a few days, the Cerimedo case took a new turn in Chile. The consultant’s arrest in Bolivia once again brought into sharp focus his ties to José Antonio Kast’s inner circle, the digital methods used during the presidential campaign, and the role of networks of anonymous accounts in attacks against various political opponents. The Chilean president had to publicly explain his ties to Cerimedo; one of his top ministers is being directly questioned about the campaign’s digital influence tactics; the Attorney General’s Office and the Comptroller General’s Office have been called upon; and a parliamentary commission of inquiry has been established. What began as a criminal investigation in Santa Cruz has thus become a full-fledged political and institutional issue in Chile.

From Chile to Brazil and Peru

Brazil could be the next step. Nadia Beller told *Folha de S.Paulo* that Cerimedo was considering supporting Flávio Bolsonaro in the 2026 presidential election. However, her account deserves to be presented accurately. When she asked him if Jair Bolsonaro’s son had a chance of winning, Cerimedo reportedly replied that the situation was difficult, but that “they were going to fight.” Beller says she understood that he intended to participate in the effort to support his candidacy, though she acknowledges not knowing whether any agreement had actually been reached. She also states that Cerimedo had met with Eduardo Bolsonaro in the United States in early August, whom she describes as “a very dear friend” of the Argentine consultant.

These statements therefore do not prove either the existence of a contract or Cerimedo’s involvement in Flávio Bolsonaro’s team. However, they take on particular significance in light of Cerimedo’s longstanding and well-documented ties to the Bolsonaro movement, particularly his remarks following the 2022 elections casting doubt on the reliability of the Brazilian vote count. That intervention also led to him being formally named in November 2024 by the Brazilian Federal Police in the investigation into the attempted coup that followed Bolsonaro’s defeat. Investigators linked him to the core group responsible for spreading false information about electronic voting machines. Cerimedo, however, was not included in February 2025 in the indictment filed by the attorney general with the Federal Supreme Court, due to a lack of sufficient evidence to establish that he was aware of the criminal plot as a whole.

His arrest in Bolivia has now reignited the interest of the Brazilian justice system: Congressman Rui Falcão asked Judge Alexandre de Moraes to obtain from the Bolivian authorities the evidence gathered on Cerimedo and his digital infrastructure.

Another recent case illustrates much more concretely how this transnational ecosystem works. On August 28, Patrícia Campos Mello, a journalist for *Folha de S.Paulo*—a major Brazilian newspaper with a liberal tradition, known for its investigations into disinformation and digital campaigns—published an investigative report based on an analysis by Observatório Lupa, the research arm of the Brazilian fact-checking agency Lupa. The report traces the origins and spread in Brazil of a campaign that portrayed the arrival of Moroccan migrants in Santa Catarina—a southern Brazilian state bordering Argentina—as an “invasion” encouraged by the Lula administration. The source of this narrative was identified: La Derecha Diario, the media outlet in which Cerimedo still held a 50% stake until the week of his arrest. The website had transformed a real event—the recent arrival of about fifty Moroccan asylum seekers—into an alleged surge in migration caused by the Brazilian government’s policies.

However, the official figures told a very different story: of the 3,059 asylum applications registered in Santa Catarina since the beginning of 2026, only 57 were from Moroccan citizens—that is, 1.86% of the total. To lend credence to the idea of an invasion, some publications also used photographs showing Moroccan migrants arriving in Ceuta, a Spanish enclave in North Africa, rather than in Brazil. Starting with *La Derecha Diario*, the narrative was picked up and adapted by various ideologically aligned accounts, primarily in Argentina and later in Brazil. Observatório Lupa counted 13,400 mentions of this narrative between August 21 and 27, while some posts reached up to 475,000 views.

The significance of this episode goes far beyond Cerimedo as an individual. For researchers at the Observatório Lupa cited by Folha, it offers a particularly relatable example of the fabrication and transnational circulation of a political narrative: a real but marginal piece of information is selected by an Argentine media outlet, exaggerated, artificially linked to Lula, illustrated with images from another continent, and then reposted in Portuguese and Spanish by ideologically aligned accounts. In other words, it is possible to observe almost in real time how a narrative crafted within the media ecosystem of Argentina’s radical right ultimately becomes campaign material for the Brazilian presidential elections.

The network also extends to Peru, where new leads emerged in early September. Diario Red had already pieced together the activities carried out in the country by Cerimedo and Javier Negre, his former partner and one of the main architects of La Derecha Diario’s international expansion, as well as their ties to Carlos Díaz-Rosillo, former White House official during Donald Trump’s first term and an influential figure in Latin American conservative networks. But an investigation published on September 1 by the Peruvian newspaper La República now provides much more concrete evidence. The travel records obtained by the newspaper confirm several visits by Cerimedo to Peru during the presidential campaign and show that he was, in particular, in Lima on July 27 and 28, 2026, at the time of Keiko Fujimori’s inauguration. Nadia Beller also provided the newspaper with a photograph that Cerimedo reportedly sent her from a hotel in Lima on July 28, in which he appears alongside a woman whom he reportedly introduced as his contact within Fujimori’s inner circle.

The same data show that Cerimedo was in Lima at the time along with two other figures associated with Keiko Fujimori: the Cuban-American Carlos Díaz-Rosillo, a former White House advisor to Donald Trump and current director of the Adam Smith Center for Economic Freedom, who has presented himself as an informal advisor to the Peruvian president; and the Argentine Damián Valenzuela Mayer, a lawyer and businessman who remained for a long time behind the scenes of Fujimori’s campaign, and whose involvement in the electoral effort was eventually acknowledged by Fujimori herself. The two men have known each other for years and maintain a personal and professional relationship. Javier Negre was also present at the ceremony and was photographed with the new president.

These details add a new dimension to Beller’s statements that Cerimedo had been asked to participate in the Peruvian campaign, but due to his activities in Bolivia, he had only been able to “help a little in the runoff.” Cerimedo himself had announced, as early as December 2025, that Peru, along with Colombia and Brazil, would be among the countries where he would continue his political activities in 2026. (La República)

This isn't some grand conspiracy, but rather a transnational ecosystem

That is probably where the true political significance of the case lies. There is no need to imagine a large clandestine center that, from Washington, Miami, Madrid, or Buenos Aires, directs the entire spectrum of Latin American radical and far-right movements. Searching for a command center of that kind could even cause us to lose sight of the much more concrete phenomenon unfolding before our eyes: the gradual formation of a transnational ecosystem in which the same consultants, the same militant media outlets, the same influencers, the same political communication techniques, the same narratives, and, at times, the same capital circulate.

Cerimedo’s career path offers an almost caricature-like illustration. From Brazilian Bolsonarism to Argentine Mileism, passing through Nasry Asfura’s Honduras and Rodrigo Paz’s Bolivia, his activities constantly cross borders. His name is now appearing in the Chilean political debate. In Peru, his visits during the election campaign and his presence in Lima at the time of Keiko Fujimori’s inauguration have already been documented, while several other figures from these transnational networks were also in the Peruvian capital. Cerimedo himself had announced, as early as December 2025, his intention to continue his activities in Colombia, Peru, and Brazil in 2026, and Nadia Beller states that he was already considering participating in the upcoming Brazilian presidential race. Surrounding him are political marketing firms, media outlets such as *La Derecha Diario*, social media specialists, infrastructures capable of simultaneously managing numerous accounts, and direct relationships with political leaders in various countries.

The case of Moroccan migrants in Brazil provides a concrete example of how this ecosystem can function. A minor news item concerning a few dozen asylum seekers is transformed, in an Argentine media outlet, into a narrative of an “invasion” attributed to Lula’s policies; footage shot in Ceuta, a Spanish enclave in North Africa, lends it an air of reality; the content crosses borders, changes languages, and ultimately finds its way into the Brazilian political debate, where some publications reach hundreds of thousands of people. This does not require a hidden command center issuing orders to all participants. Actors who share the same political interests, the same ideological references, and the same techniques can replicate the same narratives, mobilize the same infrastructure, and transfer their knowledge from one national campaign to another.

This development poses a significant democratic problem. Election regulations were designed to regulate political parties, candidates, their spending, and media outlets that operated primarily within national borders. They are far less suited to campaigns in which an Argentine consultant can intervene in Bolivia or Peru, a media outlet can produce content from one country intended to influence elections in another, and networks of anonymous accounts can amplify an issue to the point of creating the impression that it is spontaneously dominating public discourse. Who funds these infrastructures? Who owns the data collected? Who commissions and pays for these operations? How can we distinguish genuine mobilization from artificial amplification? And how can we account for campaign expenditures when part of the digital campaign is designed, funded, or disseminated from abroad?

The irony of the story is that it was neither an investigation into disinformation nor an investigation into campaign finance that led to Fernando Cerimedo’s downfall. It was three shots fired at a woman in front of a hotel in Santa Cruz de la Sierra. But his arrest opened a Pandora’s box. Phones and digital devices were seized, properties were raided, financial transactions were examined, and now cryptocurrency wallets and money-laundering schemes involving currency exchange houses are under investigation. And, above all, the questions have also begun to cross borders.

In Chile, President José Antonio Kast must now publicly explain his ties to Cerimedo, while the judiciary and state oversight agencies have been called upon to investigate the activities of the digital networks associated with his political camp. In Brazil, where Cerimedo had already been formally implicated by the Federal Police in the investigation into the attempted coup following Jair Bolsonaro’s defeat in 2022, his arrest in Bolivia has reignited questions about his role in disinformation operations and the digital infrastructure at his disposal. In Peru, his movements during the election campaign are beginning to be reconstructed, and his presence in Lima at the time of Keiko Fujimori’s inauguration has already been documented, as has that of several other figures associated with those same networks.

What emerges, therefore, goes far beyond the individual career of an Argentine political consultant. In just a few years, Cerimedo has traveled to several countries and has been in contact with some of the leading figures and movements of the Latin American far right. In his wake appear militant media outlets, international consultants, campaign managers, political marketing firms, influencers, networks of anonymous accounts, and digital infrastructures capable of crossing borders as easily as the political narratives they help spread.

Perhaps this is where the Cerimedo case becomes most revealing. It does not prove the existence of a single command center directing Latin America’s far right from a specific capital. It reveals something more diffuse, but perhaps more effective: the formation of a transnational political infrastructure in which consultants, activist media, capital, digital technologies, political narratives, and campaign managers now circulate from one country to another. These actors do not need to obey a single command to reinforce one another. They can share the same methods, reuse the same content, utilize the same channels, and transfer their expertise from one election campaign to the next.

And if this underworld is now beginning to reveal some of its secrets, it is not because the authorities in a certain country have suddenly decided to investigate these networks. It is because Nadia Beller survived the three shots fired at her in Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Cerimedo is now accused of one of the most heinous crimes imaginable: attempting to have the woman with whom he had shared his life murdered. She survived, and the investigation into that attempted murder led the police to him. If Nadia Beller had not survived, perhaps an entire part of this system would have remained in the shadows.

Main Sources

Reuters, August 18, 2026; La Nación, August 22–September 1, 2026; EFE, August 30–September 2, 2026; Folha de S.Paulo, August 26–28, 2026; BioBioChile, August 24–September 1, 2026; Unitel, August 20–September 1, 2026; Fides News Agency, August 28–September 1, 2026; Diário do Centro do Mundo, August 31, 2026; El País, August 21–31, 2026; La República (Peru), August 27–September 1, 2026; Diario Red, August 29–31, 2026; Observatório Lupa, August 28, 2026; Correo del Sur, August 31, 2026; Visión 360, August 21, 2026; UOL, August 27, 2026.

KEY POINTS — Who's Who in the Cerimedo Case?

Fernando Cerimedo — Argentina
Political consultant specializing in digital communication. Close to several figures in Latin America’s far right, he was particularly involved in the campaigns of Javier Milei in Argentina and Rodrigo Paz in Bolivia and maintained close ties to the Bolsonaro movement in Brazil. He was arrested in Bolivia on August 17, 2026, a few hours after the attack on his ex-partner, Nadia Beller.

Nadia Beller — Bolivia
A Bolivian attorney and Cerimedo’s former partner. She survived three gunshots fired at her in Santa Cruz de la Sierra on August 17, 2026. Her testimony, followed by an examination of Cerimedo’s phone and personal belongings, revealed numerous leads regarding his political, financial, and digital activities in Bolivia and several other countries.

Aldubar Herny Silva Peña, alias “Juancho” — Colombia
: A Colombian citizen wanted by Bolivian authorities for his alleged involvement in the attack on Nadia Beller. Initially identified by investigators as the man who shot her, he reappeared on September 1 in a video released from hiding. He admits to having participated in the planning of the operation but denies having fired the shot and claims that Beller was only supposed to receive “a warning.”

Javier Milei — Argentine
President. Cerimedo played an important role in his successful 2023 presidential campaign. Milei claims that their relationship ended that same year, but official records show that Cerimedo entered the Casa Rosada, the Argentine presidential palace, at least thirteen times between December 11, 2023, and June 5, 2024.

Jair Bolsonaro — Brazil
Former Brazilian president and leading figure of the Bolsonarism movement. Following his defeat by Lula in 2022, Cerimedo helped spread allegations that cast doubt on the reliability of the vote count and the electronic voting machines. The Brazilian Federal Police formally named him as a suspect in 2024 as part of their investigation into the attempted coup, although he was not subsequently included in the indictment filed with the Federal Supreme Court.

Flávio and Eduardo Bolsonaro — Brazil
: Sons of Jair Bolsonaro and political figures within the Bolsonaro movement. Nadia Beller states that Cerimedo was considering participating in the campaign to support Flávio Bolsonaro in the 2026 presidential election and that he had met with Eduardo Bolsonaro in the United States in early August.

Rodrigo Paz — Bolivian
President. Cerimedo participated in his 2025 presidential campaign and remained part of his inner circle after his election. Paz claims he never held an official position in his administration, while several accounts attribute much greater influence to him.

Edmand Lara — Bolivia’s
Vice President under Rodrigo Paz, with whom he is currently in open conflict and against whom he has declared himself an opponent. Lara claims to have seen Cerimedo participate in meetings of the Council of Ministers, give instructions to some ministers, and intervene in government decisions. On September 1, he also filed a criminal complaint against Cerimedo and First Lady María Elena Urquidi, citing, among other charges, influence peddling.

Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga — Bolivia’s
former president and Rodrigo Paz’s opponent in the runoff of the 2025 presidential election. Following the revelations about Cerimedo, he called for the creation of an independent international commission tasked with investigating the entire case.

María Argentina Rojas Roca — Bolivia
: Former customs official, briefly appointed in 2026 to head customs operations at Viru Viru International Airport despite a conviction in Brazil for drug trafficking. Bolivian authorities are now seeking her as part of the investigation into the attack on Nadia Beller. Investigators suspect, in particular, that she maintained contact with the alleged perpetrators of the attack and made money transfers on their behalf.

José Antonio Kast — Chilean
President and founder of the Republican Party, a far-right political party. He acknowledges knowing Cerimedo personally and having met with him at international political gatherings, though he denies that the consultant worked on his campaigns. The case has reignited investigations in Chile into the digital networks that interfered during the 2025 presidential campaign.

Martín Arrau — Chile
Minister of Public Safety and a member of Kast’s inner circle. A former leader of the traditional right who joined the Republican Party, he played an important role in the digital strategy of Kast’s presidential campaign. Today, he is at the center of questions regarding the methods used to push certain topics into social media conversations.

Keiko Fujimori — Peru
: Peruvian president, who took office in July 2026. Cerimedo’s travel records show that he traveled to Peru on several occasions during the election period and was in Lima at the time of her inauguration. Nadia Beller states that Cerimedo had been asked to participate in the campaign and that he had told her he had “helped out a little in the runoff.”

Carlos Díaz-Rosillo — United States / Latin
America A Cuban-American scholar and political advisor, he served as a White House official during Donald Trump’s first term. He directs the Adam Smith Center for Economic Freedom at Florida International University and has acted as an informal advisor to Keiko Fujimori. He was in Lima, along with Cerimedo, at the time of the Peruvian president’s inauguration.

Damián Valenzuela Mayer — Argentina / Peru
An Argentine lawyer and businessman who worked behind the scenes on Keiko Fujimori’s campaign. Immigration records published by the Peruvian press show numerous stays in Lima. A friend of Carlos Díaz-Rosillo, he was also in the Peruvian capital at the time of Fujimori’s inauguration.

Javier Negre — Spain / Latin
America A Spanish media executive and former partner of Cerimedo. He played a central role in the international expansion of *La Derecha Diario*, particularly in Latin America. He was in Peru during Keiko Fujimori’s inauguration and was photographed with the new president.

La Derecha Diario — Argentina / Latin
America A far-right media outlet that has become a major regional digital platform. Cerimedo played a central role there and still held a 50% stake in the company as of the week of his arrest. The outlet serves as one of the main threads for tracking the transnational circulation of the political narratives analyzed in this investigation.

Numen — Argentina
: A communications and political analysis firm linked to Cerimedo. It was particularly active in Chile during the 2020 constitutional process and illustrates the consultant’s activities and those of his networks beyond Argentina.

KEY POINTS — Trolls, bots, fake accounts: How is the impression of a majority created?

A bot is not a troll. A bot is an account whose activity is fully or partially automated by a computer program: posting a message, reposting it, following certain accounts, responding to keywords, or amplifying content. A troll is generally a human being who deliberately intervenes in online conversations—often under a false identity—to provoke, attack an opponent, spread a rumor, or polarize a debate. A single operator can manage several dozen fake accounts; conversely, a program can automatically control hundreds of accounts. In practice, manipulation tactics often combine both approaches, which may also involve real activists, influencers, or politically aligned media outlets.

So what is the purpose of the dozens of phones and SIM cards found in some digital “farms”? The platforms try to detect and eliminate automated or fake accounts. By increasing the number of devices, SIM cards, phone numbers, and sometimes Internet connections, it’s possible to create and authenticate numerous accounts, making them appear to be different users. Software can then automate part of their activity, while human operators handle tasks that require greater credibility or interaction.

The goal is to artificially generate visibility. Let’s imagine that a team wants to push the idea that a candidate is corrupt. Some accounts make the accusation. Dozens or hundreds of others repost it, comment on it, use the same keywords, or attack those who question it. Real users then begin to see the topic; some pick it up themselves; influencers take it on; and journalists may end up reporting that “the controversy is growing on social media.” An operation that was initially organized can thus take on the appearance of a spontaneous movement.

This is what is sometimes called “astroturfing”: artificially creating the appearance of a grassroots movement. The term comes from AstroTurf, an American brand of synthetic turf, as opposed to “grassroots,” which in English refers to a movement that truly originates “from the bottom up.” On social media, therefore, the goal is to fabricate a false sense of “popularity.”

These techniques have already been used on a large scale. In the United States, the Internet Research Agency—a Russian organization linked to the Kremlin—created fake profiles and fake political communities during the 2016 presidential campaign that posed as Americans. The bipartisan U.S. Senate report concluded that this operation was intended to benefit Donald Trump at the expense of Hillary Clinton and, at the same time, exacerbate existing divisions in American society. The goal was not merely to spread false information, but to infiltrate real communities, provoke reactions, and transform an operation organized from abroad into an apparently authentic political conversation.

The phenomenon was not limited to Russia. A study by the University of Oxford had already identified organized social media manipulation campaigns in 70 countries as early as 2019, compared to 28 two years earlier. In 26 of those countries, these techniques were used, among other things, to discredit opponents or stifle dissenting voices. Political parties and governments had thus gradually incorporated these methods into their own communication strategies.

Brazil offers an example particularly relevant to the Cerimedo case. During the 2018 presidential election, *Folha de S.Paulo* documented the purchase of mass messaging services—spreading anti-PT messages via WhatsApp—by businesspeople supportive of Jair Bolsonaro. Two years later, Facebook dismantled a separate network of fake accounts and pages in Brazil that posed, among other things, as media outlets, and established links between that network and individuals associated with the Social Liberal Party, as well as with staff members at the offices of Jair Bolsonaro, Eduardo Bolsonaro, and Flávio Bolsonaro.

However, we shouldn’t assume that all digital “farms” operate in the same way. Some rely primarily on automated programs; others employ people tasked with managing numerous fake profiles; still others combine bots, human trolls, activists, influencers, and compromised media outlets. With generative artificial intelligence, it is also much easier to quickly produce varied texts, images, and responses, which can make automated behavior less repetitive and harder to detect.

The power of these devices does not necessarily lie in their ability to “manufacture” public opinion from scratch. Rather, it lies in distorting the perception of the balance of power: making a minority opinion appear to be the majority view, transforming a marginal rumor into a national issue, and giving the impression that a candidate enjoys massive enthusiasm or that an opponent is the subject of widespread rejection. A bot farm, therefore, does not merely create fake accounts; it attempts to fabricate a false perception of what society thinks.

Notes

1/ Regarding Trump’s support for Nasry Asfura, see: “Former Honduran ‘Drug President’ Hernández Pardoned, Maduro Detained: Trump’s Cynicism,” by Éric Toussaint, CADTM, published on February 17, 2026.https://www.cadtm.org/Ancien-narco-president-hondurien-Hernandez-gracie-Maduro-sequestre-le-cynisme