The decision by the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP) to endorse Javier González-Olaechea’s candidacy for the Director-General of the International Labor Organization requires more than just a reaction of outrage or a simple adjective. The Peruvian labor movement is a complex actor that has undergone radical transformations in this century. Here, we will attempt to place the CGTP’s decision within a broader and more critical framework.  

The letter sent by the CGTP on September 8 is politically puzzling. González-Olaechea served as foreign minister during Dina Boluarte’s administration and is now the Peruvian government’s official candidate to head the ILO. Her candidacy also has the explicit backing of CONFIEP, which has called on various social sectors to close ranks around her. Also in the running is Yolanda Díaz, Spain’s current second vice president and minister of labor, whose political career is much more closely aligned with the historical traditions of left-wing trade unionism. The election will take place on November 16.

How, then, does Peru's leading class-based labor union end up aligning with CONFIEP and the government on an international election of this importance?

The easy explanation would be to talk about betrayal, opportunism, or simple inconsistency. This is understandable, but very simplistic and insufficient. The CGTP’s behavior can be better understood by examining the changes that Peruvian trade unionism has undergone in recent decades and, in particular, the history of one of its most important organizations: the Federation of Civil Construction Workers of Peru (FTCCP).

The FTCCP is likely the most powerful private-sector labor union in the country today. Its main strength lies in something exceptional within a deeply fragmented labor market: collective bargaining by industry. Each year, the Federation negotiates a national agreement with the Peruvian Chamber of Construction (CAPECO) that establishes wage increases and other conditions applicable to the sector.

This mechanism is much more than just a tool for advancing demands. It is the cornerstone around which a unique relationship between labor unions, employers, and the state has been built over more than twenty years. In my research on Peruvian trade unionism, I refer to this configuration as “neocorporatist trade unionism.” It is a type of trade unionism characterized by the existence of professionalized union leaders, an organization with a high capacity for sectoral representation, and a stable relationship with business associations and state agencies. Negotiation and consensus-building thus take on greater importance than open confrontation.

This characterization helps explain an apparent paradox. The FTCCP adopts a class-based stance, actively participates in the CGTP, and can take highly critical political positions toward the current government. At the same time, however, it maintains an institutionalized and relatively stable relationship with CAPECO and the government. 

The two can coexist. For years, the Federation has pursued a sort of dual policy on alliances. Through the CGTP, it participates in general mobilizations and platforms alongside other unions and left-wing organizations. But when it comes to the specific interests of the construction industry, it establishes cooperative relationships with professional associations, public agencies, and business organizations. My research revealed precisely this combination of general political opposition and sector-specific collaboration.

The key lies in understanding what is at the heart of the arrangement. For the FTCCP, the fundamental strategic tool is industry-wide collective bargaining. Maintaining it requires simultaneously preserving two forms of recognition: that of the State as the representative negotiating partner for civil construction workers, and that of CAPECO as the employer counterpart. My research shows that the Federation has deliberately built institutional agreements with both actors to preserve that position.

Here lies an especially important factor in understanding the CGTP’s current decision: the growing influence of a union culture forged within the FTCCP, where the preservation of collective bargaining and institutional channels for dialogue with employers and the government plays a central role. This approach has been developed over more than two decades by a stable and professionalized leadership, accustomed to making sector-wide bargaining the primary measure of union effectiveness.

The problem arises when that rationality begins to influence the leadership of a labor federation such as the CGTP. There, the risk is that the federation’s class-based tradition will be subordinated to a more pragmatic approach that is limited to preserving avenues for negotiation, securing institutional recognition, and avoiding rifts with strategic business partners. 

This takes on special importance in the current situation. The FTCCP is once again presenting its national list of demands for sector-based collective bargaining. At the same time, there is a threat that construction leaders are well aware of: that the government will change the rules of representation and include parallel organizations (so-called “pseudo-unions”) at the bargaining table.

For the Federation, this scenario would be extremely dangerous. Collective bargaining by industry works because, in practice, there is a predominant union representative facing a clearly defined employer representative. Introducing parallel organizations would weaken the FTCCP’s representation, fragment the bargaining process, and, eventually, could erode the mechanism that underpins much of its union power.

Until now, the government has tended to avoid direct intervention in this matter, leaving considerable leeway for the relationship that has developed between CAPECO and the FTCCP. It is precisely this institutional structure that the Federation needs to preserve.

In this context, the CGTP’s endorsement of González-Olaechea may take on a different meaning. CONFIEP publicly announced its support for his candidacy on September 5. Three days later, the CGTP sent a letter to the chair of the ILO Governing Body endorsing the same candidate. The timing is politically striking. The employers’ association had even expressly asked the various national sectors to join in supporting the candidacy.

We must be thorough here. To the best of our knowledge, there is no public evidence that CONFIEP has asked the FTCCP or the CGTP for their support in exchange for any guarantees regarding collective bargaining in the civil construction sector. It would be irresponsible to state this as a fact.

But there is a reasonable political hypothesis worth considering. For an organization whose strategic resources depend on a stable institutional relationship with business leaders and the government, supporting a candidate whom both consider important can serve as a signal of cooperation. This is all the more true given that the new administration could change the rules that have thus far protected sector-wide bargaining.

From this perspective, the decision no longer seems inexplicable. It follows the same logic that has allowed the FTCCP to survive and grow stronger over the past two decades: using politics as a tool to preserve collective bargaining. In neo-corporatist unionism, political alliances can vary because the strategic objective remains relatively stable. My research finds precisely this instrumental conception of politics: relationships with government ministries, officials, business leaders, and political actors aimed at ensuring institutional dialogue and, in particular, sector-based bargaining.

The problem arises when this sectoral logic is applied to the leadership of a national federation. A federation may consider it rational to exchange political gestures in order to protect a collective bargaining agreement. The CGTP represents, at least formally, something broader: a general conception of workers’ interests. That is where the contradiction becomes much more apparent.

Because the ILO election also involves a debate over the direction that the leading international labor institution should take. From that perspective, it is difficult to explain why a labor federation that continues to define itself as class-based would prefer the candidate backed by Peru’s leading business organization over a European leader whose recent track record is associated with labor reforms, an increase in the minimum wage, the promotion of stable employment, and dialogue with labor federations.

This is precisely where one of the central problems of contemporary Peruvian unionism lies. Class consciousness continues to function as a declared identity, as a language, a historical memory, and a source of legitimacy. But it increasingly fails to explain the concrete decisions made by the organizations. In practice, unions have developed much more diverse and pragmatic strategies. This gap between discourse and action is one of the central findings of my research in recent years: organizations that continue to call themselves class-based act in accordance with very different identity-based frameworks, adapted to their resources, organizational structures, and relationships with employers and the state.

The CGTP’s support for González-Olaechea seems to dramatically confirm this transformation. A few decades ago, it would have been almost inconceivable for Peru’s leading class-based labor federation, the APRA-affiliated labor federation, the main business organization, and the government to all back the same international candidate against a leader identified with the left and the European labor movement.

It could happen today. Not because the differences between employers and workers have disappeared. Those differences remain and are evident every day in wages, working conditions, layoffs, outsourcing, and collective bargaining. What has changed is the way certain union leaders manage those contradictions.

Neocorporatism delivers concrete results: sector-based bargaining, political dialogue, organizational stability, and the ability to secure wage increases. That is precisely why it is effective. But it also comes at a cost. When preserving the institutional arrangement becomes the top priority, political boundaries begin to shift. Yesterday’s adversaries can become allies of convenience, and general principles can be subordinated to the need to preserve the bargaining system.

The question raised by the support for González-Olaechea, then, goes far beyond an election in Geneva. It is a question about the CGTP itself. To what extent is the neo-corporatist logic successfully developed by the FTCCP also beginning to shape the political decisions of the country’s main labor federation?

If that hypothesis is correct, we would be facing a significant change. Classism would continue to dominate discourse, bylaws, and historical commemorations. But fundamental decisions would be limited to preserving institutional spaces, managing relationships with those in power, and securing organizational resources. 

And then the letter dated September 8 would no longer be an anomaly. Rather, it would be a particularly clear window into the reality of Peruvian labor unionism.