The Teachers' Union Movement: Among the social movements and currents in Iran in recent years, perhaps no movement has attracted as much public attention and media coverage as the teachers' occupational movement and its widespread protest activities. Therefore, it cannot be denied that this movement, particularly during periods when it succeeded in organizing extensive protests and coordination across the country, has influenced discourse-building within labor and occupational movements, as well as demand-oriented civil currents in Iran, and brought about changes in how social demands are framed and pursued. By linking teachers' livelihood and job-related demands with the defense of public education, opposition to privatization, and the call for equal educational access for children, this movement was able to transcend the professional issues of its members and emerge as one of the recognized voices of advocacy in society.

However, this very capacity for organization and social impact has placed the teachers' occupational movement even more under government surveillance and control. Security, judicial, and administrative pressures on unions and activists have increased at various stages, gradually limiting the possibility of open and coordinated activity. The peak of these pressures can be observed in the years 1400 and 1401 (corresponding to 2021–2022), a period marked by the arrest of numerous activists, the filing of judicial cases, and the accusation of serious charges such as espionage and regime change against some of their most prominent figures. These confrontations dealt a severe blow to union structures, which were already facing legal and security restrictions, deprivation from holding general assemblies, and difficulties in organizing openly.

In fact, the government attempted to widen the gap between minimal and major educational demands within the union body by offering limited responses to some teachers' demands, including the implementation of the grading plan, while simultaneously tightening the space for organizational activity through continuous pressure and administrative and judicial case-building. Unions that for years had been unable to hold general assemblies freely and were forced to conduct a significant portion of their communications and activities through informal mechanisms gradually lost a major part of their organizational capacity and mobilization potential. Consequently, the broad occupational actions of teachers, which previously manifested themselves in the form of gatherings, sit-ins, and large-scale street demonstrations, gave way to issuing statements and taking virtual positions. While these actions are important for preserving the voice of protest and registering demands, they cannot be compared with collective actions in terms of mobilization scope and the ability to impose costs on the opposing side.

As a result of this process, in recent years and months, some well-known occupational activists have left the country due to continuous pressures, and connections between some influential figures, domestic unions within Iran, and the public sphere—taking into account wartime conditions and heightened security restrictions—have taken on a new form, affecting the position of the Coordination Council of Iranian Teachers' Occupational Unions as one of the central hubs for coordinating and reflecting teachers' protests in the media. To such an extent that it now appears that collective decision-making mechanisms, experience transfer, representation of demands, and maintaining contact with the body of teachers are facing greater difficulties.

In other words, the continuation of repression, the erosion of organizational capacities, and the changing position of occupational activists are gradually exerting a negative impact on internal union relations, decision-making mechanisms, and the ability to achieve common strategies. This can be clearly seen in the exchanged messages within groups attributed to various factions of teachers' occupational actors in cyberspace. Actors who seemed until recently to stand united in occupational and educational orientations, as well as political leanings, and who had at least not openly expressed their differences in virtual spaces, now complain about the persistence of certain approaches and strategies regarding the style of occupational action and have begun criticizing one another.

Loss of Social Authority and Survival Rationality

Two recent notes by Azar Qasemzadeh and Mohammad Habibi, well-known figures in the teachers' occupational movement, approach this issue from two different angles. Qasemzadeh, in his discussion on the loss of social authority of the teachers' movement, directs attention to the gap between the history of activism and the actual capacity for impact. Habibi, in proposing the concept of "survival rationality," emphasizes the necessity of preserving forces, communication networks, and organizational capacities under conditions of repression. These two discussions, alongside recent criticisms raised in virtual spaces regarding how the Coordination Council is managed, decision-making methods, and disputes over representation and participation within it by some activists, make it possible to raise the question: has the teachers' occupational movement been able to strike a balance between the necessity of self-preservation under repression and the necessity of rebuilding its social and organizational power? And if the survival strategy gradually replaces the strategy of change, what fate awaits an organization that was once one of the important centers for organizing demands in Iran?From this perspective, Qasemzadeh's discussion of social leadership revolves around the relationship between the organization, the teaching body, and society. In contrast, Habibi's discourse on survival rationality leads us to ask: in conditions where open action is constrained, how can remaining forces and connections be preserved without confining trade union activity to a set of low-cost actions lacking a clear horizon? Placing these two viewpoints together provides an appropriate starting point for examining the current crisis. The survival of the organization is undeniable, but this survival only acquires meaning and strategic function when it leads to rebuilding collective action capacity, strengthening ties with the teaching body, and enabling the resumption of demands; otherwise, the organization may remain in existence yet gradually lose its ability to effect change.

Survival Strategy Sometimes Becomes a "Trap"

This situation can be termed a "survival trap." In this trap, any costly action is potentially perceived as a threat to the organization's existence, yet there is no clear plan for rebuilding collective capacity. On one hand, protest actions are abandoned due to their risks; on the other, it remains unclear how lost capacities should be restored, how connections with the teaching body can be expanded, how new forces can be integrated into the organizing process, and how trade union demands can once again become an effective issue in public space.

In the short term, such an approach may help preserve part of the network and reduce immediate risks, but in the long term it can lead to the gradual erosion of the organization. When members do not know what current activities are intended to achieve, participation loses meaning for them. When core demands are perpetually deferred to an uncertain future, the bond between the organization and the social body weakens. When the sole criterion of success is that the trade union continues to exist, reductions in mobilization capacity, narrowing of communication circles, and loss of public trust may be accepted as unavoidable costs of the situation, without any plan to address them.

Under such conditions, the organization may remain administratively and formally intact, yet gradually distance itself from the power to intervene in relations that were formed for their transformation. The survival of the organization replaces the survival of collective action capacity; preserving structure takes precedence over maintaining connections with members; avoiding risk replaces a prudent assessment of risks and benefits. The outcome of this process is not necessarily sudden collapse, but rather a form of gradual immobilization. In such conditions, the organization's capacity for changing the situation also diminishes.

Despite all this, the strategy of change should not be equated with constant calls for street protests or ignoring the costs of repression. Change can be pursued through other pathways during periods when open action is constrained. Rebuilding connections with teachers in schools and various regions, maintaining the link between livelihood demands and the defense of public education, training and supporting new forces, documenting experiences of struggle, producing a public narrative about educational inequality, and strengthening cooperation among organizations are among such activities. Such activities acquire strategic meaning only when connected to a clear and evaluable goal, rather than becoming merely a scattered list of programs.

From this perspective, Qasemzadeh's critique and Habibi's emphasis on survival are not contradictory statements. The former warns that continuous activity does not necessarily lead to impact, while the latter reminds us that without preserving forces and networks, the possibility of impact also disappears. The missing link lies in how to transform preserved capacity into power to advance demands, so that the process of change is not indefinitely delayed under the guise of survival, nor does it lead to internal divisions that create rifts within the trade union body.

How Repression Intensifies Internal Divisions

Differences of opinion and even internal conflicts are, to some extent, a natural part of the life of any trade union or collective organization. Part of this can reflect differences in members' experiences, perspectives, and assessments of conditions and future strategies, becoming a serious issue only when competition over preserving positions or monopolizing decision-making overrides collective organizational goals and affects the pursuit of demands. Another part of this process, however, occurs as a result of continued repression. Repression, by limiting the possibility of free dialogue, weakening internal organizational communications, removing or alienating some activists, and complicating transparent decision-making mechanisms, can deepen distrust and exacerbate existing divides.

The reality is that political and security repression affects organizations not only through arrests or direct confrontation with activists. Repression can alter decision-making structures, communication patterns, information distribution, and even criteria of trust. When some activists are arrested, deprived of activity, or rendered inaccessible, part of the organization's experience and connections may also be lost. When free and regular communication becomes difficult, members' access to equal information decreases; simultaneously, when decision-making is conducted under emergency conditions, the likelihood of concentration and monopolization of authority in the hands of a limited number of individuals increases. This concentration may initially serve as a practical response to existing threats, but if mechanisms for oversight, review, and accountability are absent, it can gradually become a source of conflict over the legitimacy of decisions.In other words, repression can create conditions that exacerbate existing differences and make their resolution more difficult, even if it is not necessarily the origin of all conflicts. Disputes over the timing and form of protest may be manageable strategic disagreements under normal circumstances; however, in an environment characterized by distrust and information constraints, such disputes can transform into accusations of capitulation, monopolistic behavior, or irresponsibility. A decision perceived by one faction as a precautionary measure to preserve organizational integrity may be interpreted by another faction as an attempt to prevent collective action or to maintain control over the organization.

Here, it is essential to distinguish between "the structural effect of repression" and "organized interference designed to sow discord." To explain the former, it is not necessary to assume that every internal crisis has been engineered from outside. However, to substantiate the latter, clear evidence regarding coordination, intent, and mechanisms of intervention is required. The mere existence of differences, a reduction in protest activity, or the coincidence of a decision with security pressure does not, by itself, prove that such a decision was the result of planning by a security institution.

Nevertheless, ignoring the possibility that the regime may exploit existing differences is also an error. Authoritarian structures can leverage existing gaps, unequal access to information, and competition over representation; even if they have not created all these divisions themselves.

Hierarchy of Repression: From External Pressure to Internal Trust Crisis

This process can be examined at multiple levels. At the first level, direct security, judicial, and occupational pressure includes arrest, summons, dossier creation, threats of job deprivation, and restrictions on assembly and communication. These pressures raise the cost of participation and alter the composition of active forces.

At the second level, organizational effects of these pressures emerge. Convening meetings becomes more difficult, communications are restricted, experienced personnel lose their roles, and the likelihood of decision-making concentrating in the hands of those with greater ability to attend or communicate increases. Here, the issue is not merely external pressure; how the organization adapts to that pressure also becomes significant.

At the third level, questions of legitimacy and internal trust arise: who has access to information, who participates in decision-making, and whether members can critique adopted decisions. If answers to these questions remain unclear, a dispute over a specific decision can escalate into broader doubts about the validity of the entire decision-making mechanism.

At the fourth level, the consequences of this situation manifest in collective action: difficulty reaching consensus on demands and tactics, diminished mutual trust, weakened inter-organization collaboration, and reduced capacity for mobilizing forces. At this stage, external pressure can amplify its impact on protest capacity and organizational ability through the pathway of an internal trust crisis.

This framework provides an analytical model for understanding the relationship between repression and organizational crises. Its value lies in demonstrating that repression is not limited to the number of arrests, canceled assemblies, or prevention of organizational structuring; rather, its effects must be sought in the quality of internal relationships, decision-making processes, and the capacity to regenerate collective potential.

From this perspective, preserving organizational structure does not merely mean protecting individuals from direct pressure. Maintaining equal opportunities for participation, information circulation, critique of decisions, and resolution of conflicts also constitutes part of resisting the consequences of repression. An organization forced to temporarily concentrate certain powers for survival must make clear decisions regarding the scope, duration, and review mechanisms of such concentration; otherwise, emergency mechanisms may become permanent modes of organizational governance.

Reconstructing a Strategy of Change: From Preserving Organizations to Rebuilding Collective Power

Exiting the current situation does not mean ignoring security risks or hastily returning to the streets with forms of protest for which the necessary capacity and readiness do not exist under prevailing conditions. The issue lies in formulating a strategy that connects real conditions, available resources, action costs, and long-term goals. Such a strategy must be able to explain to members what takes priority at each stage, what role current activities play in advancing objectives, and by what criteria success can be measured.

One axis of this strategy is reconnecting teachers' livelihood demands with the broader issue of public education. Livelihood, job security, and professional dignity are independent and legitimate demands for teachers; however, linking them to educational quality, privatization, educational inequality, and equal access for children to schools—even in a country grappling with multiple economic and social crises—can expand the social impact of the movement. This linkage will be effective only if it draws on the real experiences of teachers and families and clearly explains how a teacher's employment status and the structure of the education system influence one another.

Another key axis is rebuilding organizational capacity. Organizations that depend on a limited number of well-known figures to continue their activities are vulnerable to arrest, threats, or the departure of any of these individuals. Transferring experience, cultivating new forces, distributing responsibilities, and creating opportunities for participation at various levels can reduce dependence on a few individuals. This does not mean disregarding the experience of seasoned activists; rather, it signifies transforming individual experience into the collective memory and capacity of the organization.Third, in this direction, it is necessary to rebuild the relationship between organizations and the teaching body. Professional representation does not emerge merely through issuing statements or speaking on behalf of teachers alone. This relationship requires sustained engagement, attentive listening to diverse demands, clear explanation of decisions, and the provision of opportunities for genuine participation. If organizations maintain contact only with a limited circle of activists during periods of repression, they may gradually drift away from the experiences and concerns of broader segments of the teaching body. Rebuilding this connection should be one of the primary criteria for evaluating activities.

Fourth, we must define indicators to measure progress. The number of meetings or statements issued alone does not indicate that an organization has been strengthened. We must ask whether member participation has increased and whether experiences have been shared; whether trust and collaboration among organizations have improved; and whether demands have been articulated with greater clarity.

Such criteria help move "survival" from an ambiguous and unmeasurable condition into a defined framework. In this way, even if an organization is compelled at a certain stage to refrain from launching costly protest calls, it can demonstrate how that decision relates to a strategy for preserving and rebuilding collective capacity. Conversely, if months or years pass without any capacity emerging for broader engagement, deeper participation, or advancement of demands, we cannot simply equate the continuation of limited activities with strategic survival success.

Within this framework, a strategy of change does not necessarily mean setting a specific date for a major protest. Sometimes the most significant change in a given period lies in rebuilding trust, expanding participation, or reaching sustainable agreements on rules of cooperation. However, these activities must be part of a pathway leading to increased collective capacity, rather than becoming an excuse for permanently sidelining demands.

Conclusion: What to Survive and for What Change

If the emphasis on survival rationality versus activism remains framed as a choice between two opposing options, no clear solution emerges. Without survival, the possibility of sustaining collective action disappears; yet, as noted earlier, a form of survival that lacks any vision for rebuilding power and advancing demands can lead to stagnation and paralysis within organizations. The issue is that activists must be able to discuss how each decision relates to the organization's real capacity, its costs, and the goal it aims to pursue.

The Coordination Council, in order to move beyond this current situation, needs above all rules that guarantee equal participation, transparency, accountability, the right to critique, and fair resolution of disputes, as well as a strategy that links daily activities to clear, evaluable objectives. These two necessities are interdependent. On one hand, without democratic rules and transparent decision-making mechanisms, disagreements can lead to distrust and organizational erosion, weakening collective capacity; on the other hand, even an organization that follows democratic rules in its internal management may remain confined to preserving the existing structure if it lacks a strategy for change and advancing demands, rebuilding connections with the teaching body, and reviving the power of claim-making. Therefore, the goal should not be limited merely to preserving organizational survival or improving its mode of governance; rather, it must lead to creating an organization that can, while maintaining cohesion and enabling member participation, also enhance its capacity for change and advancing demands.