The victory of the Student List in the Serbian parliamentary elections on October 25, 2026, marks the end of fourteen years of dominance by Aleksandar Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party. With approximately 53% of the votes and a projected absolute majority in parliament, the Student List achieved a result that until recently seemed almost unimaginable. The nature of this victory and Serbia's political future are difficult to understand through conventional categories such as government versus opposition, liberalism versus conservatism, or European integration versus national sovereignty.

At the center of Serbia's political transformation was a mass student movement, behind which lay a conflict between two elites: the political elite built by Vučić's regime over the preceding decade and a half, and an academic elite that had remained relatively independent of its governance system. The decisive factor was the latter's ability to forge an alliance with the student movement, which had developed a distinctive form of participatory populism. This alliance made possible the political mobilization that led to the change of government.

This populist movement did not emerge around demands for a radical transformation of Serbia's economic or foreign policy. In many areas it reproduced existing political consensus, and promised that similar policies could be applied without corruption, organized crime, nepotism, or employment based on party affiliation. The greatest challenge the new government will face is dismantling the clientelist mechanisms of the previous regime and, at the same time, demonstrating whether its relatively popular economic model can be sustained without resorting to the same mechanisms of capital accumulation and political control.

A single-party system within a multiparty democracy

One of the most important characteristics of Vučić's political dominance was the systematic weakening of the multiparty system, even when formal institutions of parliamentary democracy remained intact. The Serbian Progressive Party sought to incorporate almost all political actors with significant electoral support. Political organizations and their leaders were offered positions within the ruling coalition, often through guaranteed spots in joint electoral lists, while those who refused to cooperate faced various forms of pressure, marginalization, and political destruction.

The result was an attempt to establish a kind of single-party system within a formally multiparty democracy. Almost all significant ideological positions had room within the ruling coalition, from nationalist and conservative currents to liberal, pro-European, and socially oriented ones. Ideological conflicts were largely shifted from electoral competition to internal relations within the ruling bloc. Elections increasingly became referendums on the exercise of power and attitudes toward Vučić's regime rather than contests between alternative political programs. Opposition parties that remained outside this system failed to build a sufficiently broad social base or establish a different political agenda.

At the same time, Vučić developed an exceptionally extensive party and electoral machinery. Its operation depended on political loyalty, control of public sector employment, securing so-called capillary votes, and various forms of pressure on voters. Affiliation with the ruling party, or willingness to secure votes for it, became an important prerequisite for obtaining employment, advancing in one's career, and accessing public resources. Gradually, this system went beyond its electoral function and became a fundamental mechanism for organizing social and economic relations.

For a teacher who had held temporary contracts for years, a health worker awaiting a permanent job, or an employee of a state-owned company, party affiliation could directly determine their professional future. Similar mechanisms extended to the private sector through business networking, public procurement, and privileged access to state resources. Alongside major financial scandals widely reported by the media, corruption became a daily experience for a large part of the population. Almost anyone seeking employment, advancing in their career, or accessing certain rights could encounter the consequences of party clientelism.

Alongside systemic nepotism, the regime was accompanied by serious scandals that raised questions about the links between state structures and organized crime. Among them are the Jovanjica case, which consisted of the discovery of a large marijuana plantation allegedly protected by members of security services, and a murder in a Belgrade restaurant, whose alleged cover-up implicated the then head of the Belgrade police. The problem for Vučić was that, once established, the network of loyalties required the continuous protection of its members. Sanctioning people for criminal activity or corruption could threaten the stability of the entire system, which rested on the expectation that political loyalty would be rewarded and protected.

Therefore, the electoral machinery gradually became a burden for the regime itself. The mechanisms that allowed it to stay in power simultaneously generated increasingly widespread social discontent.

The academic elite that Vučić failed to incorporate

In contrast to political and business elites, which he successfully connected through a system of mutual interests, Vučić never fully incorporated Serbia's academic elite.

By "academic elite" I mean a broader stratum of highly qualified professionals, professional managers, economists, lawyers, intellectuals, university professors, researchers, and people working in non-governmental organizations. Their social authority is based mainly on education, professional qualifications, and experience, rather than control of the party apparatus. Throughout his term, Vučić tried to attract sectors of this elite. The appointment of Ana Brnabić to high government positions and the promotion of Siniša Mali were important elements of this effort. Through figures like these, people from the business world, academia, and the NGO sector were incorporated into state administration and political leadership to provide the regime with professional legitimacy and an image of modernization.

This alliance remained relatively limited and unstable. Universities, with the University of Belgrade at the forefront, never became firm bastions of the ruling party. University teachers and researchers had long been expressing their discontent with the regime, although this discontent was not necessarily associated with a shared opposition ideology. Shortly before the outbreak of student protests, the conflict intensified after announcements that foreign private universities could access public funds intended for higher education. Such a model, similar to certain educational voucher systems, raised the possibility of diverting budgetary resources from public universities to private institutions. The academic community viewed this as a threat of greater subordination of education to business interests linked to political power. Thus, the conflict between universities and the regime also affected the immediate material interests of the academic community.

When the canopy of the reconstructed Novi Sad railway station collapsed in November 2024 and caused the death of sixteen people, this existing conflict acquired a completely new dimension. The tragedy was widely perceived as emblematic of a system in which political loyalty, opaque management, and corrupt relationships had displaced expert knowledge and professional responsibility. Regardless of the specific technical causes of the collapse, the question arose of how such a major infrastructure project, presented as a symbol of the country's modernization, could have been completed without adequate safety supervision.

The student rebellion that followed received widespread support from university faculty. This alliance also had a very immediate foundation: students and professors already knew each other, met daily in their faculties, and shared the same institutional space. For students, the academic elite included their own teachers, with whom they could communicate and cooperate directly. Despite occasional conflicts surrounding blockades, universities, particularly the University of Belgrade, became crucial pillars of the movement, providing it with institutional, moral, and practical support.

The regime responded to the rebellion by relying even more on the party cadres. The formation of Đuro Macut's government, following the political crisis triggered by the protests, did not entail any significant reconciliation with the academic community. Figures who had not demonstrated sufficient loyalty to the party were further marginalized from the government, reinforcing a system in which real political power resided in the party's informal hierarchy, while ministers and other formal officeholders enjoyed limited autonomy.

Student assemblies and the emergence of a populist movement

The student movement arising from university blockades developed a distinctive organizational model based on direct democracy. Assemblies were established at faculties, where students made decisions regarding demands, protests, and other activities. Participation in these assemblies varied considerably, and informal hierarchies emerged over time. Working groups tasked with preparing proposals often acquired substantial autonomy, while assemblies ratified decisions crafted by a relatively small number of active participants. As the movement continued, the number of students directly involved in everyday decision-making gradually declined.

Nevertheless, the assemblies retained their role as the primary source of legitimacy for the student movement. Their importance also lay in their capacity to generate broad social mobilization. Student marches between cities, multi-day walks, bicycle tours, mass demonstrations, and complex logistical operations involved a large number of young people. Many did not necessarily participate in formulating political demands, but, by organizing these activities, they became active members of the movement. The student movement allowed them to integrate into a broader political community through collective action, without requiring them to adopt a specific political ideology beforehand.

The students carefully avoided ideological and political positions that could undermine broad social support, and sought to present themselves as a movement representing the interests of society as a whole. Although the organizational model of the assemblies had affinities with anarchist and horizontal traditions, its political content was not revolutionary. Broad participation fostered the reproduction of prevailing social attitudes, since only demands acceptable to a large number of participants could garner support. The radicalism of the student movement resided mainly in its methods of organization and its challenge to the existing government, rather than in its ideological program.

The alliance between populism and expert knowledge

The most unusual feature of the student movement was its alliance with the academic elite. In many contemporary Western societies, populist movements develop in opposition to educated elites, experts, and professional managers. Academic institutions are often portrayed as part of an alienated establishment, detached from the everyday concerns of ordinary people. In Serbia, a mass populist movement embraced the academic elite as a natural political ally. Education, expert knowledge, professional qualifications, and cultural capital became central elements of its political identity.

This was clearly reflected in how students were presented publicly. They were described as educated, honest, responsible, and capable young people: future doctors, engineers, teachers, and specialists. Particular emphasis was placed on the message that they wanted to stay in Serbia and build their professional future in their own country. This narrative corresponded directly to the experience of discontent with the Vučić regime. In a society where employment and promotion depend on party connections, the natural alternative seems to be one where knowledge, qualifications, and professional competence are valued. The fight against corruption and nepotism thus became the link between the academic elite and the populist base.

This alliance also involved a certain fetishization of expert knowledge: the expectation that people with appropriate professional training and qualifications, free from ties to the discredited political class, would be better prepared to govern the country. Such belief overlooks that expert knowledge in a specific field does not automatically translate into political competence, and that professional elites have their own social interests that do not always coincide with those of the majority of the population. Nevertheless, the combination of populist mobilization and the authority of expert knowledge allowed the student movement to go beyond universities and become a serious political alternative.

This was also reflected in the composition of the Student List. Among its candidates were university professors, economists, lawyers, specialists from various fields, and a significant number of people from non-governmental organizations.

Why the student movement did not develop a new ideology

When the student movement decided to stop directing demands at the existing government and instead call for parliamentary elections, it took a step that initially might have seemed an abandonment of its original logic of direct democracy. However, this decision was consistent with the populist character of the movement. Although based on principles of direct democracy, the student assemblies reproduced another dominant social belief: that parliamentary elections are the main mechanism for political change.

At the same time, they kept their distance from existing political parties. This was often explained by the organizational characteristics of the student movement. Since the assemblies had no permanent representatives authorized to negotiate on behalf of the movement as a whole, cooperation with political parties was institutionally complicated. There was also a deeper ideological reason. The student movement could hardly negotiate a common program with parties that had clearly defined political positions. Cooperating with liberals, conservatives, nationalists, or social democrats would have required the movement to take a stance on issues over which its own base was divided. Its political strength depended on its ability to prevent those divisions from opening up.

The Student List represented what society widely perceived as normal political order. Its fundamental demand was a state free of corruption, institutions that functioned correctly, and expert knowledge taking precedence over party affiliation. For this reason, the election campaign was largely free of traditional ideological conflicts. Vučić tried to present the Student List as a political force that would change his economic and foreign policies, endanger relations with Russia, or question existing social benefits. The Student List generally responded that such changes were not its goal and that it would apply existing policies more effectively and responsibly. There was considerably greater programmatic continuity between the two main electoral lists than their intense political confrontation might suggest.

Even when the Student List expressed its opposition to the cheap labor policy promoted by Vučić's regime in its early years, the difference was not entirely clear. During the previous decade, the regime itself had tried to distance itself from the image of a country that attracted foreign investors solely for its low wages, and instead promoted technological development, investment in science, and more sophisticated industrial investment. There is a substantial difference between political rhetoric and actual economic results, but the conflict was largely about who was capable of implementing the desired economic model.

A similar logic applied to foreign policy. The Vučić government sought to maintain relations with the European Union, Russia, and China while avoiding full alignment with any international bloc. This policy enjoyed relatively broad support in society, which gave the Student List few grounds to question it radically. The central electoral choice was much simpler: the continuation of a system based on party loyalty or its replacement by another promising a professional government.

A plebiscitary victory and the defeat of the political class

Election results confirmed the strength of this political mobilization. According to preliminary data from the Electoral Commission of the Republic, the Student List obtained 52.65% of the votes, while the list headed by Aleksandar Vučić received 39.22%. Turnout was approximately 69%, and seat projections indicated that the Student List could form a parliamentary majority on its own. Vučić's electoral machinery managed to retain a substantial part of its voter base, but it could not match the exceptionally broad mobilization of voters seeking political change.

The student movement succeeded in giving the elections the character of a referendum. The vote was presented as a decision on whether the existing government system should survive, and this atmosphere effectively eliminated the space for traditional opposition parties. The majority withdrew from the electoral race, and those who remained achieved insignificant results. No non-minority list, apart from the two dominant ones, surpassed the electoral threshold. Thus, the student movement defeated Vučić and effectively replaced the previous opposition.

This may be the most important political consequence of the elections. Serbia did not obtain a new ruling party representing a clearly defined ideological alternative to the previous government. A movement whose legitimacy rests on the combination of mass mobilization, rejection of corruption, and trust in expert knowledge secured a parliamentary majority.

Real estate development: the drug feeding Vučić's economic model

The Vučić regime survived thanks to its electoral machinery and clientelist relations, but its political stability also depended on its ability to provide economic growth, relative stability of living standards, and increased purchasing power. The economic policy of the previous government was more complex than it is often presented in opposition circles.

During the preceding decade, Serbia benefited from certain advantages derived from its position in foreign policy. Maintaining relations with Russia provided access to relatively affordable energy, while cooperation with China brought significant investments, particularly in industry, mining, and infrastructure. In this sense, Serbia's economic model shared certain similarities with policies applied by Hungary and Slovakia. At the same time, maintaining a stable exchange rate of the Serbian currency against the euro was an important instrument for preserving purchasing power. For a population whose consumption depends largely on imported goods, and for citizens with loans or other obligations denominated in euros, exchange rate stability had immediate economic importance. The regime also sought to ensure increases in pensions, public sector salaries, and various social benefits. Regardless of the actual scope and distributive effects of these measures, they contributed to maintaining social support for the existing economic model.

Real estate development became one of its most important pillars. Large infrastructure projects, development of residential and commercial complexes, the Belgrade Waterfront project, preparations for the EXPO, and other related urban developments sustained construction activity, created jobs, and contributed to GDP growth. The problem was excessive dependence of the economy on large construction projects, often luxury ones, whose contribution to economic activity ended largely when the work concluded. Moreover, a substantial part of the work was carried out by foreign companies that brought their own workers and left after completing the projects, leaving limited long-term benefits for the national economy.

In Serbia, real estate development also fulfilled a clearly political function. Large construction and infrastructure projects were among the key mechanisms linking political and business elites. Control over land, urban planning decisions, public procurement, and investment projects created opportunities for private capital accumulation. Real estate development thus became one of the mechanisms through which people linked to political power could themselves become capitalists. This model generated powerful interdependence between political authority, investors, and the construction sector. Political control provided access to profitable projects, while those projects contributed to economic growth on which the government based part of its legitimacy.

In this sense, real estate development became something of a drug for the Vučić regime. It allowed satisfying two important demands simultaneously: the continued enrichment of the business elite with political connections and maintaining a level of economic activity high enough for living standards to keep rising. Each new large-scale project prolonged the operation of this model and, at the same time, increased dependence on its continuous expansion.

The future of large urban development projects thus acquired political importance. The opposition by the Student List to the commercial redevelopment plans for the General Staff complex in Belgrade, linked to the investment interests of the family of US President Donald Trump, was a visible expression of rejection of the previous approach to managing urban space and public resources. Consequently, the new government will face a serious problem: if it intends to dismantle the corrupt mechanisms of the previous regime, it will also have to change the mode of operation of one of the important engines of economic growth.

Economic limitations of the new government

The Student List presented an ambitious reform programme, particularly in education, science, culture, health and social protection. This programme reflects its social composition and the important role of the academic and professional elite in its elaboration. Fulfilling these promises will require substantial public resources.

One of the assumptions on which the new government's optimism is based is that fighting corruption will release sufficient resources to finance the promised reforms. More transparent public procurement, more rational investment and less misuse of public funds could certainly generate substantial savings. However, it remains unknown whether they will be sufficient. Even with a significant reduction in corruption, Serbia would still face low productivity, limited public revenues, dependence on foreign investment and structural weaknesses in its national economy.

The possible reorientation of economic development poses an especially complex challenge. If the new government attempted to reduce dependence on real estate development and place greater emphasis on export-oriented production, it would encounter limitations stemming from the existing monetary and economic model. Strengthening the competitiveness of national agriculture and certain industrial sectors, for example, could raise questions about the real value of the dinar. Depreciation of the national currency could improve the price competitiveness of exports but would also make imported goods more expensive and erode purchasing power. Such a measure would not automatically solve production problems and could have serious social consequences. Preserving purchasing power was one of the important promises of the Student List. Its populist base does not expect an economic policy that asks citizens to accept a declining standard of living in the name of long-term development goals.

Similar limitations apply to the emigration of young people and educated individuals. Over the last two years, the student movement strongly emphasized that young people wanted to stay in Serbia and build their future there. However, the emigration of skilled workers is not exclusively a consequence of corruption or an authoritarian government. The experience of Croatia shows that even EU member states can face large-scale labour emigration, and that free movement within the European labour market can facilitate migration to richer countries.

Therefore, the new government will face a series of problems for which there are no simple technical solutions. Its response to the question of future economic development revolves mainly around increasing productivity, one of the most difficult tasks of economic policy, which requires long-term structural change and not simply the replacement of political personnel.

Will the populist base control the new elite?

The most important issue following the electoral victory is the relationship that the new government will establish with the movement that brought it to power. During the last two years, student plenums were the main source of legitimacy for the movement. They decided on political demands, forms of mobilization, and, finally, the transition to parliamentary politics. The process of drafting the Student List also demonstrated the movement's insistence on controlling its representatives. Candidates underwent lengthy scrutiny procedures regarding their biographies and professional integrity, with the aim of preventing the nomination of individuals whose past could compromise the entire movement. This approach reflected the fundamental political message that power must be entrusted to competent and unblemished people.

The entry into parliament of around 140 representatives of the Student List creates a completely new situation. The deputies will now possess formal political legitimacy, access to state institutions, and the capacity to participate directly in decision-making. They will no longer be mere delegates of a protest movement, but holders of parliamentary mandates. The question is whether the new government will continue to recognize the authority of student plenums and other participatory forms of organization. The plenums themselves have already weakened considerably: their activity is declining and fewer students are participating. If they succeed in preserving their organizational structures and their connections with elected representatives, they could function as a mechanism of social control over the new government, limiting the autonomy of professional administrators and their capacity to implement policies contrary to the expectations of the movement's electoral base.

There is also the possibility that the link with the student movement will gradually be severed. In that case, the academic elite, which already occupies a prominent position within the Student List, could become the dominant political force in the new government. Its representatives could begin to behave like the professional political and managerial elites of Western societies, justifying unpopular measures by appealing to economic necessity, fiscal responsibility, or market demands.

The deputies of the Student List have diverse political convictions. Some are closer to liberal and pro-European positions, others to conservative or nationalist positions, and some candidates are associated with socially oriented policies. While the main goal was to overthrow the Vučić regime, these differences did not necessarily have to become politically decisive. Once the new government faces concrete issues of taxation, privatization, public spending, labor legislation, and international relations, ideological conflicts could become inevitable. It is easy to imagine that liberal, conservative, nationalist, or left-wing groups will gradually emerge within the parliamentary majority. Such evolution would mark the end of the particular populist unity that made the electoral victory possible and could open the way to neoliberal reforms, austerity policies, or other measures that directly threaten the standard of living of sectors of the population.

Between political normalization and a new democracy

The victory of the Student List demonstrated that even an exceptionally sophisticated party machine can be defeated through broad social mobilization. The student movement united a large part of the population around demands to end corruption, nepotism, and partisan control of institutions. Its fundamental promise was political normalization.

The immediate consequences of this victory are already visible. From the perspective of Radnički glas (The Voice of Workers), an organization of which I am a member and that works with trade unions in education, research, culture, and other sectors, the change in political relations was felt practically overnight. Just one day after the elections, we already observed changes in the behavior of certain directors and managers, while questions arise about the future of numerous procedures initiated against employees who opposed the government. A military union that announced several months ago that it was ceasing its activity due to political pressure has now issued a new statement suggesting that it might resume its work.

Partisan nepotism was a daily experience for a large number of employees. For many people, the victory of the Student List therefore brings a sense of relief from immediate pressure. The possibility of speaking more freely at work, refusing to obey a political instruction, or planning a professional future without depending on partisan loyalty represents a tangible change. This helps explain the massive celebrations following the elections.

The victory has also opened up the possibility of transforming political representation itself. Here we encounter what is perhaps the most interesting and apparently paradoxical similarity between the Student List and Vučić's regime. Both, in different ways, displaced the traditional multiparty system based on competition between ideologically defined parties. Vučić incorporated various political options into his ruling coalition and subordinated them to the party apparatus and its hierarchy. The Student List brought together ideologically diverse representatives around a common political goal, but built its legitimacy through mass participation rather than through a traditional party organization.

The absence of clearly defined party programs need not be a weakness of the new political order. Competition between political parties, in which citizens periodically choose between pre-formulated programs, is not the only possible form of democratic representation. The student movement demonstrated that it could mobilize an enormous number of people who had never belonged to political parties or been involved in political activism before. Their participation went beyond protests: they organized the election campaign, protected polling stations, and directly supervised the electoral process. People who had previously been mere voters became active participants in political life.

The question is whether this form of participation can be maintained after the electoral victory. The student assemblies have already weakened, but the social energy released by the movement need not remain exclusively tied to them. It is especially significant that many candidates from the Student List are professionally established individuals without previous political ambitions. Their willingness to accept parliamentary mandates does not necessarily imply a desire to become professional politicians. Understanding political office as a temporary social responsibility could help establish a different relationship between representatives and those represented.

Trade unions could play an important role in this process. Unlike student assemblies, whose activity is tied to the changing composition of the student population, trade unions have more durable organizational structures, direct connections with workers, and concrete demands arising from everyday labor relations. In the political space opening up after the fall of the previous regime, they could assert themselves as one of the organized voices from below.

This would also imply a different relationship with parliamentary power. Trade unions need not be limited to traditional social dialogue, appeals to ministries, and occasional negotiations with government officials. They could establish lasting links with deputies from the Student List, following the example of cooperation they developed with student assemblies during the protests, and use those relationships to articulate workers' demands and pressure the government. Fulfilling the promises of the student program, including the expansion of labor rights, could provide a common framework for that action, while trade unions preserve their independence and their role as an organized voice for workers.

Such a relationship could offer a way to go beyond the limitations of representative parliamentary democracy. Organized social groups could participate directly in shaping political decisions and overseeing their implementation. Parliament could then become a place where the demands of the social base are articulated, rather than an institution in which professional politicians make decisions independently between one electoral cycle and the next.

The most important opportunity opened up by the victory of the Student List lies in the chance to liberate political representation from its exclusive dependence on competition between parties and to build a more durable link between elected representatives and an active, organized society. The student movement has already demonstrated that mass political participation can exist outside traditional political parties. Its next challenge will be to demonstrate whether that participation can endure when the movement's representatives constitute the governing parliamentary majority.

Srđan Atanasovski. Member of Radnički glas (The Voice of Workers)